De Maiziere’s decision followed two weeks of intense lobbying in Berlin, Brussels and Washington by Embassy Berlin, USEU, the Departments of Treasury, State and Justice and the NSC. The campaign included calls by Secretaries Clinton, Geithner, the Attorney General and the National Security Advisor to their German counterparts. State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator Benjamin urged support for the agreement during a two-day visit to Berlin (see septel). Ambassador Murphy twice wrote to all five relevant ministers (Interior, Justice, Finance, Chancellery, and MFA) and made repeated calls to senior decision makers, stressing the importance of the interim agreement and the need for Germany to not block it. The DCM, Econ M/C, and staff from multiple embassy sections heavily engaged on the issue as well.
While successful, the strategy wasn’t particularly appreciated:
De Maiziere intimated, and working level contacts have confirmed, that Germany would like to avoid a repeat of our all-out lobbying effort during the negotiations for a long-term TFTP agreement. (…)
Nevertheless, the intensity of this dispute should be a wake up call – we must avoid repeating this as we look to completing the long-term U.S.-EU TFTP agreement. The coalition agreement calls for strict limitations on the use of TFTP data, no automatic access to the system, data deletion requirements, clear rules on sharing information with third parties and legal redress. These positions will guide Germany’s views in the follow-on negotiations, and we need to consider how to take them into account in a way that does not complicate TFTP implementation.
In an earlier cable from November 2009 (09BERLIN1393) the US was concerned initially about De Maiziere.
During his first day remarks to employees, de Maiziere made the peculiar statement that “the Interior Ministry is responsible for internal matters, and the Foreign Ministry is responsible for issues external to Germany.” This characterization of the MoI’s tasks contrasts sharply with EU law enforcement integration initiatives under Schaeuble such as the Pruem data sharing agreement. (…) More relevant is whether de
Maiziere will build on Schaeuble’s record of deepening U.S.-German security cooperation, such as the successful negotiations of a bilateral “Pruem-like” agreement to exchange information on terrorism and serious crime suspects, as well as establish an automated fingerprint checking system.
But the US was really worried aboutthe prospect of having the FDP in the future German government. Cable 09BERLIN1167expressed fears that the FDP has ‘favored data protection measures over the need for governments to strengthen security-related information sharing for counterterrorism purposes':
Immediately following the March 2008 completion of the U.S.-German data sharing
agreement to enhance cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism and other serious crime (aka, the Pruem-like agreement, Ref C), FDP parliamentarians began to express concerns regarding the agreement. FDP members took particular aim at an article in the agreement that calls for additional data protection measures to be taken if special categories of personal data (such as ethnic origin, political opinion, religion, trade union membership, and sexual orientation) are transferred among law enforcement agencies. (Comment: In our discussions with FDP parliamentarians, we explained that negotiators did not foresee that such information would need to be transferred regularly and that the article was inserted as a means of providing extra data privacy protections in the rare occurrence that such information was pertinent to an investigation. End Comment.)
In meetings with EMIN, Stadler and Piltz also expressed objections to the data retention periods of the agreement, questioned which USG law enforcement agencies would have access to the information, and voiced a general concern about potential misuse of the personal information (names, DOBs, addresses, passport numbers, etc.) that would be shared by the agreement. Piltz further claimed that the U.S. government as a whole lacked effective data protection measures in comparison to Germany and questioned why the USG does not have a overall federal data protection commissioner as Germany does. (Comment: Piltz’ remark underscores the importance of ensuring German officials receive information about USG data protection policy. The April visit to Berlin by DHS Chief Privacy Officer Callahan was useful in this regard, but more needs to be done to ensure German officials understand U.S. data protection policy. End Comment.)
At times, the FDP’s fixation on data privacy and protection issues looks to have come at
the expense of the party forming responsible views on security policy. The FDP has been out of power for over 10 years and lack experience tackling security issues in the Internet age. The FDP appears not to fully grasp the transnational character of terrorism today and terrorists’ increasing use of the Internet and related technology to recruit, train and organize. In particular, a FDP-led Justice Ministry could well complicate implementation of the bilateral Pruem-like agreement, prevent negotiations on a HSPD-6 terrorist screening data sharing arrangement, and raise objections to U.S.-EU information sharing initiatives.