“I think there’s an urgent need to amend the anti-terror laws, especially on the length of sentences,” he told reporters after being appointed to his new role.
“There were many who were released (from jail) and then got involved again. There were those who were sentenced to seven years but after three years they were given remissions. This is strange, isn’t it?”
He said some terrorists had been arrested but had to be released because police did not have enough time to gather evidence.
“Later it’s clear they were involved again and then they had to be shot, like Air Setiawan,” he said, referring to an alleged terrorist who was killed by police last year after twin suicide attacks on Jakarta hotels in July.
The discovery of a militant training camp in Aceh province in February — which gathered Islamist extremists from around the region — also highlighted the need for laws against preparatory acts, Mbai said.
“Militant training hasn’t been included as a crime… In other countries it’s considered a serious crime,” he said.
“Then there are those activities which provoke or incite people to carry out acts of terror… The focus is prevention. We have to prevent them before they take part in militant training which means they must be arrested.”
He said incitement to burn Christian churches or expel “infidels” should be criminalised to prevent Indonesia being “showered in bombs”.
“If there’s no conviction we’ll always be reactive. Wait for the bomb to go off and only then become nervous. That’s too late,” he said.
Indonesia was also studying the experience of Saudi Arabia to improve its deradicalisation programme, which has been dismissed as a myth by top anti-terror police officers.
Senior police have recently issued stark warnings that the Southeast Asian country’s prisons are at risk of becoming schools of violent jihad rather than institutions of reform.
Presidential Regulation No. 46 of 2010 was made under the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law (Law No. 15 of 2003) and tasks the new agency with “formulating policies/national programs, coordinating government offices concerned with regard to its implementation and implementing policies in the field of anti-terrorism by set up [sic] taskforces with members from government offices in line with their respective tasks, functions, authorities.” )
The agency will be responsible to the President of Indonesia, but coordination responsibilities will sit with the Coordinating Minister for Security, Political and Legal Affairs. (Id.) The regulation places existing anti-terrorism units under one authority, including the National Police’s Anti-Terror Squad (known as Detachment 88), the National Intelligence Agency, anti-terrorism units from the Indonesian military, as well as the Anti-Terrorism Desk currently operating under the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Security and Legal Affairs.
A spokesman from the Minister’s office said that it was hoped that the structure and staffing of the agency would be settled by the end of the year and that “[w]e will equip all units with personnel from various fields who possess the specific skills to perform the tasks required.”
Some human rights activists have raised concerns about aspects of the new agency, saying that the regulation should be clearer about what constitutes a “radical” group or individual and about the extent to which the military will be involved in enforcing anti-terrorism laws.
An ostensibly above-ground organisation, it has embraced individuals with known ties to fugitive extremists. It has welcomed many members of the militant Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) but clashed with the JI leadership over strategy and tactics. It preaches jihad against Islam’s enemies but insists it stays within the law – though it rejects man-made laws as illegitimate. (…)
The dark side of JAT’s activities came into the spotlight on 6 May 2010, when Indonesian police raided its Jakarta headquarters and charged three officials with raising funds for a militant training camp uncovered in Aceh in late February. On 12 May, police carried out a reconstruction of a meeting in South Jakarta involving two men now in custody known to have served as camp instructors and another, who wore a large name tag reading “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir”. JAT’s alleged involvement in fundraising and combat training immediately led to speculation that another arrest of 72-year-old Ba’asyir was imminent.
Even if he is arrested – for the third time since the first Bali bombs – the impact will be limited, both in terms of Indonesian extremism and the domestic political fallout. Ba’asyir has been a perpetual thorn in the side of successive governments since the early 1970s. He is very much the elder statesman of Indonesia’s radical movement, but he is neither the driving force behind it now nor its leading ideologue, and he has numerous critics among fellow jihadis who cite his lack of strategic sense and poor management skills. (…)
The truth is that the jihadi project has failed in Indonesia. The rifts and shifting alignments so evident now in the jihadi community are a reaction to that failure. There is no indication that violent extremism is gaining ground. Instead, as with JAT’s formation, we are seeing the same old faces finding new packages for old goods. The far bigger challenge for Indonesia is to manage the aspirations of the thousands who join JAT rallies for its public message: that democracy is antithetical to Islam, that only an Islamic state can uphold the faith, and that Islamic law must be the source of all justice. (…)
The final straw appears to have been the re-arrest Wednesday of Abdullah Sunata, 32, on suspicion of plotting attacks on the Danish embassy and a police parade. He was released from jail last year for good behaviour after serving only a fraction of a seven-year sentence for his role in a 2004 attack on the Australian embassy, which killed 10 people.
National police spokesman Edward Aritonang said Sunata’s case was further evidence that Indonesia’s prisons, far from helping to rehabilitate terrorists, risked turning into terrorist “schools”.
It is time to look at a “new system or method, so the counselling for prisoners truly works and prisons don’t become schools” of radicalisation, he said.
Counter-terrorism squad chief Colonel Tito Karnavian complains that the notoriously corrupt correction system effectively provides extremists a sanctuary to preach, recruit and plot.
Recognising the danger, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has ordered the creation of a national counter-terrorism body, focusing on prevention and rehabilitation, which will report directly to him. But Karnavian warned that an “extra-judicial body” would be “prone to be politicised” — a possible reference to Islamic parties in the ruling coalition — and said police should remain in charge of all counter-terrorism efforts.
Noor Huda Ismail, a former extremist who now works directly with terrorist prisoners to bring them back into moderate society, said Indonesia had never had a proper deradicalisation plan.
Witnesses of the operation in east Jakarta told The Associated Press that none of the three suspects appeared to carry a weapon or to put up much resistance. Police deny that, saying they were armed and dangerous.
Authorities have identified only one of the suspects: Maulana, who was shot in the chest, was accused of involvement in a jihadi training camp in Aceh province and a failed plot on Indonesia’s deputy house speaker, said National Police Chief Gen. Bambang Hendarso Danuri.
The other two men remain unidentified — and, it now appears, may have been implicated simply because they were riding with Maulana in the taxi. Police claim they were linked to the Aceh cell as well.
This episode is not unusual in Indonesia, where U.S.-trained forces at the core of the anti-terror fight have a startling kill-to-capture ratio: One suspect killed for every four arrested.
The deaths not only raise human rights concerns, but risk fueling Islamist propaganda and tarnishing what has been a highly praised campaign that has seen hundreds of suspects arrested and convicted. The killings also mean the suspects cannot be questioned and there is no chance to gather intelligence on their networks.